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ABSTRACT
This article revisits the emergence of stop and frisk law in the 1960s to
make three points. One, the impetus for formalizing police stops arose
midst confusion generated by Mapp v. Ohio, the landmark Warren Court
opinion incorporating the exclusionary rule to the states. Two, police
over-reactions to Mapp intersected with fears of urban riots, leading to a
formalization of stop and frisk rules that aimed at better containing innercity minority populations. Three, the heightened control of urban streets
coupled with the heightened protection of the private home bore
geographic implications, interiorizing liberty in ways that perpetuated a
national narrative of expanding freedoms even as it contributed to black
incarceration.
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Behind police brutality there is social brutality, economic brutality, and
political brutality.
– Eldridge Cleaver1

INTRODUCTION

Few issues in American criminal justice have proven more toxic to
police/community relations than stop and frisk. To take just one example,
federal judge Shira Scheindlin recently declared that stops lacking
“individualized reasonable suspicion” had become so “pervasive and
persistent” in New York City that they not only reflected “standard
[police] procedure,” but had become “a fact of daily life” for minority
residents.2 Scheindlin promptly ordered “immediate changes to the
NYPD’s policies,” meanwhile recalling the Supreme Court’s observation
in Terry v. Ohio that “the degree of community resentment” caused by a
particular police practice could influence judicial “assessment” of that
practice.3
Scheindlin’s invocation of Terry as a curb on stop and frisk proved
remarkable. According to most accounts, Terry marked a turning point in
the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure revolution, a move away from
extending constitutional rights to minorities and towards granting
increased discretion to police, through the sanctioning of stop and frisk.4
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University 1998, BA Wesleyan University 1994. I would like to thank Tracey Meares,
David Sklansky, Jeffrey Fagan, Devon Carbado, Darryl K. Brown, Kami Chavis
Simmons, Scott Sundby, Arnold Loewy, Eric J. Miller, and Joel Goldstein for input on
this piece. I would also like to thank Adina Schwartz, Dorothy Schultz, and the members
of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice faculty for early conversations on this topic,
including insight into the role that riots played in the development of a Humanities
curriculum for the New York City Police Department.
1
ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE 133 (1968).
2
David Floyd, et al, v. City of New York, 08 Civ. 1034 (S. D. N. Y. filed August 12,
2013).
3
David Floyd, et al, v. City of New York, 08 Civ. 1034 (S. D. N. Y. filed August 12,
2013), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, at 14 n.11 (1968).
4
Tracey Meares, The Warren Court Criminal Justice Revolution: Reflections a
Generation Later, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 105, 106 (2005) (describing the Warren Court’s
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Yet, Scheindlin’s point evokes a different history, one that played out
almost half a century ago on the streets of New York. At that time, Terry
did not betray the Warren Court’s revolution so much as compensate for
tensions exacerbated by it, particularly issues triggered by Mapp v. Ohio;
the landmark 1961 opinion extending the exclusionary rule to the states.5
Praised for requiring that police procure detailed warrants before entering
private homes, Mapp actually worsened interactions between police and
minorities on the street, in part by encouraging police to develop creative
means of stopping suspects; including techniques that involved
intimidation and violence.6 As news of such methods began to spread, the
NYPD itself began to lobby for more formalized stop and frisk
requirements, hoping to reduce the likelihood of police/minority conflict.7
The Supreme Court’s eventual approval of such requirements in Terry v.
Ohio and a companion case styled Sibron v. New York, marked a
standardization of police procedure that appeared to facilitate local
policing, even as it bore larger, geographic implications.8 No longer free

criminal procedure cases as “a branch of ‘race law’” that aimed to ameliorate racial
inequality); Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and
the Equality Principle 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 1, 7 (2011) (arguing that an interest in
equality animated the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution); CHARLES
WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF
CASES AND CONCEPTS 1 (5th ed. 2008) (noting that the Court’s procedure rulings were
partly “triggered by the Supreme Court’s growing appreciation of the position occupied
by the ‘underprivileged’ of society – minority groups, the poor, and the young”); Arnold
H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment: History, Purpose, and Remedies, 43 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 1 (2010).
5
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
6
See infra §II. The argument made here is different from Darryl K. Brown’s claim that
the Warren Court’s criminal procedure rulings “prompted widespread opposition that
took the form of political debate and reform efforts.” Darryl K. Brown, The Warren
Court, Criminal Procedure Reform, and Retributive Punishment, 59 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1411, 1416 (2002). While Brown is correct, this article posits that the Court’s
criminal procedure rulings also served to obscure urban inequalities, long before
engendering a conservative, legislative backlash. Also, the backlash that did ensue in
New York aimed not to undue the Warren Court’s decisions so much as to limit the
negative effect that Mapp v. Ohio had on street altercations between urban minorities and
police. For an argument similar to Brown’s, see William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997);
CHARLES WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 1 (5th ed. 2008) (noting that the Court’s procedure
rulings were partly “triggered by the Supreme Court’s growing appreciation of the
position occupied by the ‘underprivileged’ of society – minority groups, the poor, and the
young”); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment: History, Purpose, and Remedies, 43
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1 (2010).
7
See infra §III.
8
The argument that the Warren Court’s criminal procedure decisions were ultimately a
theatrical move to reduce police/minority tensions does not contradict the claim, made by
Devon Carbado, that police/minority interactions constitute “racial theater.” See, e.g.
Devon Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 953 (2002).
On the contrary, this piece argues the Warren Court became very interested in improving
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to enter homes without warrants, police in New York intensified their
focus on public spaces, pushing liberty indoors and setting the stage for
the increased surveillance of the public sphere, a move that facilitated the
apprehension and incarceration of black men.9
While criminal law scholar Michelle Alexander has shown that
stop and frisks “often serve as the gateway into the criminal justice
system” for “young men of color,” she occludes the complex forces that
led to their rise.10 This Article seeks to identify those forces, relating the
rise of stop and frisk rules to liberal politics, Cold War concerns, and
spatial dynamics. To illustrate, this article will proceed in three parts.
Part I will demonstrate how Mapp v. Ohio coincided with judicial
frustration at police intrusions into private, intimate space – including
private thought – precisely at a time when the United States sought to
distinguish itself from totalitarian “thought control” regimes during the
Cold War. Part II will show how the Court’s effort to prevent thought
control and guard intimate space in Mapp engendered an unanticipated
public effect, leading police both to lie about arrests and to use more
violent means for procuring evidence from suspects on the street.11
Finally, Part III will show how such street-level tensions played out at the
local and national levels, interiorizing liberty in ways that allowed for a
narrative of expanding freedoms midst a climate of increased police
control.12
Though scholars tend to cite 1968 as a turning point in Warren
Court jurisprudence, a moment when liberal impulses on the Court
succumbed to a conservative “counter-revolution,” this article suggests a
more fractured narrative – one in which liberal and conservative justices
alike tolerated expansions of domestic liberty but moved increasingly,
inadvertently, to heightening regulations of urban landscapes.13 Here,
the theatrical quality of such interactions, partly to reduce the likelihood that bystanders
would react negatively to police searches and arrests.
9
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS, 134-137 (2010)
10
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS, 136 (2010).
11
Sarah Barlow, Patterns of Arrests for Misdemeanor Narcotics Possession: Manhattan
Police Practices 1960-1962, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 555-60 (1968).
12
While Michelle Alexander focuses heavily on conservative backlash politics, this
Article places responsibility at the feet of liberal reformers as well. See, e.g. MICHELLE
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS, 136 (2010).
13
For the “counter-revolution” metaphor, see PRISCILLA H. MACHADO ZOTTI, INJUSTICE
FOR ALL: MAPP VS. OHIO AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 170 (2005). See also Yale
Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, 31
TULSA L. J. 1, 2-3 (1995); LUCAS A. POWE, THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN
POLITICS 407-411 (2000); Christopher Slobogin, The Liberal Assault on the Fourth
Amendment 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 603 (2007); Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial
Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287 (1982); Devon W. Carbado,
(E)racing the Fourth Amendment 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002); William J. Stuntz, The
Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1288 (1999);
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concerns over state infringement on personal privacy in the 1950s help
explain the Court’s interest in expanding liberty in private, intimate
settings, meanwhile moving quickly to contain direct action protest and
violence in public spaces.14 Over time, the Warren Court’s criminal
procedure revolution assumed a geographic dimension, pushing liberty
into discrete spaces that posed little threat of violent crime, political
disorder or riots.15
That the Court interiorized liberty in the 1960s is a point that
scholars have only hinted at.16 For example, criminal procedure scholars
David Sklansky and Jeannie Suk have both raised the intimacy dimensions
of Supreme Court Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence.17 To
Sklansky, the Court’s concern with the Fourth Amendment stemmed in
part from an interest in thwarting police harassment of gay men.18 For
Suk, the Court’s interest in the Fourth Amendment coincided with a larger
interest in protecting intimate space, particularly the home – a place where
“woman,” as the Court put it in 1961, “is still regarded as the center of

A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REV. 249, 256
(1968); SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 192 (2nd ed., 1998); Dan M. Kahan & Tracy Meares, The Coming Crisis of
Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO.L.J. 1153, 1156-59 (1998). For a related reading of the
Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution, see Eric J. Miller, The Warren Court’s
Regulatory Revolution in Criminal Procedure, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2010) (arguing that
the Warren Court did not extend rights to criminal defendants so much as insist on “interbranch regulation” of police/defendant interaction. To Miller, the Court pursued a
“republican” approach to criminal justice regulation. This article posits a more ad hoc
approach: first an expansion of liberty in intimate spaces and then a move towards
containing blacks in urban ghettos); Fabio Arcila, Suspicion and the Protection of Fourth
Amendment Values, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 237 (arguing that Fourth Amendment values
include not simply aiding minorities but “limiting governmental discretion, protecting
privacy and dignitary interests, minimizing intrusiveness, and assuring a compelling and
legitimate governmental need for a search”).
14
ELAINE TYLER MAY, HOMEWARD BOUND: AMERICAN FAMILIES IN THE COLD WAR
ERA 133-34 (1988).
15
The argument in this piece tracks criminal law scholar Bernard Harcourt’s effort to
“expose the real stakes” in the debate over police searches, arguing that improved police
procedure plays a critical role in the maintenance of structural inequality. Bernard
Harcourt, Unconstitutional Police Searches and Collective Responsibility, 3
CRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY 363, 365 (2004).
16
David Alan Sklansky,“One Train May Hide Another”: Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret
Subtext of Criminal Procedure,” 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875 (2008); Jeannie Suk, Is
Privacy a Woman? 97 GEO. L.J. 485, 490 (2009).
17
David Alan Sklansky, “One Train May Hide Another”: Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret
Subtext of Criminal Procedure,” 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875 (2008); Jeannie Suk, Is
Privacy a Woman? 97 GEO. L.J. 485, 490 (2009).
18
Sklansky suggests that the Court’s interest in restricting state eavesdropping on phone
lines stemmed from a spatial concern over state surveillance of intimate relations
between gay men in toilet stalls. See David Alan Sklansky, “One Train May Hide
Another”: Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret Subtext of Criminal Procedure,” 41 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 875 (2008).
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home and family life.”19 Both scholars characterize the Court’s concern
for regulating police in terms that evoke intimate relationships, either
between same sex couples or couples of the opposite sex, pairs that bear
little in common with isolated individuals on the street.
Building on Suk and Sklansky, this article posits that the Court’s
interest in curtailing police stemmed less from an interest in ameliorating
substantive inequality than expanding the scope of freedom in politically
neutral, private spaces. Though remembered as a bid to help the poor, in
other words, many of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure decisions
actually did little to help the less affluent.20 Black activists in New York
argued precisely this point in the 1960s, questioning the Court’s concern
for the poor and agreeing with police that law enforcement’s function vis a
vis minorities had shifted from “[c]rime prevention” to “peace-keeping” a
role aimed primarily at controlling urban landscapes.21 According to
black writer James Baldwin, the Court’s campaign to soften police
procedure sought primarily to contain black urban populations; or as he
put it to “corral and control the ghetto.”22 In fact, from 1961 to 1968, New
York City police and radical black leaders alike complained that the city
was heightening the risk of urban violence by focusing on
procedural/privacy matters, meanwhile ignoring structural causes of
poverty and inequality.23 Rather than level the playing field between rich
and poor, in other words, the Warren Court’s procedure rulings struck
black activists and New York City cops alike as a type of theatre aimed at
preserving inequality by holstering the truncheon, improving the
management of the poor rather than fixing underlying socio-economic
problems plaguing urban communities.24
19

Jeannie Suk, Is Privacy a Woman? 97 GEO. L.J. 485, 509 (2009) citing Hoyt v. Florida,
368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961). Suk shows how feminists challenged gendered tropes of privacy
in the late twentieth century in JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY (2009).
20
CHARLES WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 1 (5th ed. 2008) (noting that the Court’s procedure
rulings were partly “triggered by the Supreme Court’s growing appreciation of the
position occupied by the ‘underprivileged’ of society – minority groups, the poor, and the
young”).
21
In June 1969, CUNY Sociology professor and former NYPD officer Arthur
Niederhoffer posited that police had suddenly taken on two very different roles, “[c]rime
prevention” and “peace-keeping” both of which were “antithetical.” The Changing City:
Crime on the Rise, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1969, 35.
22
James Baldwin, James Baldwin on the Harlem Riots, N.Y. POST, August 2, 1964, 3.
23
For works documenting police/Panther violence, see PAUL ALKEBULAN, SURVIVAL
PENDING REVOLUTION: THE HISTORY OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY 200-233 (2007);
CURTIS J. AUSTIN, UP AGAINST THE WALL: VIOLENCE AND THE MAKING AND UNMAKING
OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY (2006); WILLIAM L VAN DEBURG, NEW DAY IN
BABYLON: THE BLACK POWER MOVEMENT AND AMERICAN CULTURE, 1965-1975 (1992).
24
Id. The use of theatre described in this piece aimed to obscure larger inequalities in
American society, not to act as “a morality play for those involved in the nitty gritty of
law enforcement,” as Scott Sundby argues in Mapp v. Ohio’s Unsung Hero: The
Suppression Hearing as Morality Play 85 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 255, 257 (2010).
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That criminal procedure served a theatrical function in the 1960s
coincides with the argument made by criminologist Peter K. Manning that
much of modern policing hinges on image management, on maintaining
“public support” for police by curtailing violence and engaging in a larger
“drama of control.”25 According to Manning, this drama became
particularly important in the United States as “the rise of large minority
populations in urban areas and their exclusion from many opportunities
changed the problems of urban social integration and crime into the more
serious issue of politically managing a rising underclass demanding wider
access to all forms of community service.”26 Though Manning focuses his
inquiry on the rise of community policing in the 1980s, his analytic can be
extended further, to the 1960s, and extended to include the federal
judiciary.27 During that time, this article posits, the drama of control
became crucial not only to local police but also to the Supreme Court,
who – as we shall see – moved aggressively to improve the image of urban
police even as it constrained the protest powers of urban minorities, all
part of a larger move to facilitate “managing a rising underclass.”28
I. THOUGHT CONTROL
Though oft-considered an opening salvo in the Warren Court’s
criminal procedure revolution, Mapp v. Ohio began its constitutional
journey as a dispute over dirty books.29 Suspected of harboring a person
involved in a local bombing, Dollree Mapp confronted police at her
Cleveland home on May 23, 1957, seized a document that they proclaimed
to be a warrant, and stuffed it in her shirt.30 After a tussle, police
recovered the paper and proceeded to search Mapp’s house, ultimately
discovering four books: London Stage Affairs, Affairs of a Troubador,
Memoirs of a Hotel Man, and Little Darlings, together with “a nude pencil

25

Peter K. Manning, Community Policing as a Drama of Control in COMMUNITY
POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 28 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds.,
1991).
26
Peter K. Manning, Community Policing as a Drama of Control in COMMUNITY
POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 27 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds.,
1991).
27
Peter K. Manning, Community Policing as a Drama of Control in COMMUNITY
POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 27 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds.,
1991).
28
Peter K. Manning, Community Policing as a Drama of Control in COMMUNITY
POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 27 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds.,
1991). Bernard Harcourt has identified a similar irony in the imposition of curfew laws
in urban parks, noting how the enforcement of such laws curtail political demonstrations
but do little to silence corporate speech in the form of public advertisements. See
Bernard Harcourt, The Occupy Chicago Arrests: Rahm Emanuel’s ‘dry run’ for G8 and
Nato? guardian.co.uk, Feb. 15, 2012.
29
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
30
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 644 (1961)
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sketch,” and “several photos found in a suitcase.”31 Convinced that the
items were obscene, police arrested her for “possession of obscene
pictures and books.”32
Though Mapp’s attorneys fought to exclude the evidence at trial,
they abandoned that position on appeal, arguing instead that Ohio’s
obscenity statute was unconstitutionally vague and that Mapp’s arrest was
so outrageous as to warrant an acquittal.33 The latter argument followed
Rochin v. California, a 1952 Supreme Court case chastising police for
ordering a defendant’s stomach pumped to retrieve heroine, something the
Court found so egregious that it not only “shocked the conscience,” but
violated the Constitution.34 Just as unconstitutional, argued Mapp’s legal
counsel, was Ohio’s obscenity law, a relatively recent measure that
expanded criminal liability from manufacturers and sellers of pornography
to private citizens.35 On this point, Mapp received support from the Ohio
Civil Liberties Union, or OCLU, who argued that the law was not
rationally related to a legitimate state interest, failed to adequately define
obscenity, and invaded the “private rights” of individuals.36 Such rights,
argued the OCLU, stemmed from the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments – a type of emanation argument that prefigured Griswold v.
Connecticut.37 Also, the OCLU’s First Amendment attack drew strength
from a 1959 Supreme Court case, Smith v. California, holding that even
though obscenity did not warrant constitutional protection, a state law
prohibiting mere possession of obscene books by merchants violated the
First Amendment.38
Though the First Amendment question failed to persuade a
requisite majority of Ohio’s Supreme Court, it did capture the attention of
the nation’s highest tribunal.39 In conferences and private discussions on
the case, Justice Harlan argued persuasively that the core issue of the case
was “thought control.”40 Others concurred. In fact, the day after oral
arguments in the case, all of the Justices “agreed” that the core concern in
Mapp was the manner in which Ohio’s obscenity law amounted to a
“thought control statute.”41
The Court’s identification of Ohio’s obscenity law as a thought
control statute is worth noting. The term first emerged in the 1920s when
31

CAROLYN N. LONG, MAPP V. OHIO: GUARDING AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES & SEIZURES 8 (2006).
32
Id., at 13.
33
Id., at 25.
34
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
35
CAROLYN N. LONG, MAPP V. OHIO: GUARDING AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES & SEIZURES 26 (2006).
36
Id., at 27.
37
Id., at 27.
38
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
39
CAROLYN N. LONG, MAPP V. OHIO: GUARDING AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES & SEIZURES 63 (2006).
40
Id., at 82.
41
Id., at 82.
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word broke that the Japanese government was considering new statutory
means of regulating dissent.42 Such stories became even more prevalent
during World War II, when both Japan and Nazi Germany imposed strict
regulations on public thought and speech.43 Following the war, many in
the West suspected the Soviet Union of imposing thought control on its
people, inspiring author George Orwell to pen an alarming critique of
totalitarianism entitled 1984.44 Published in 1949, 1984 resonated with
concerns that the Soviet Union had established within its borders a police
state denying freedom of thought to its citizens.45
Some Americans warned that such restraints were coming to the
United States. In 1949, Princeton University President Dodds argued that
were it not for the nation’s sustained support of private institutions,
particularly private schools, Americans might succumb to “a growing
threat of Government ‘thought control.’”46 Five years later, Florida
attorney John M. Coe accused the federal government of just that,
declaring that the Internal Security Act put “the government in the
thought-control business” by placing restraints on “speech, press, and
assembly.”47
Enacted over a presidential veto in 1950, the Internal Security, or
McCarran Act required that communists forgo employment in
government, unions, and the defense industry, meanwhile registering with
the Subversive Activities Control Board, a government agency formed to
neutralize domestic communist threats.48 Though the Supreme Court
declared the McCarran Act constitutional in 1951, it hardened its view in
1955 as Senator Joseph McCarthy accused military officials of communist
sympathies, compromising the credibility of anti-communists nationally.49
In 1957, the Court overturned the convictions of fourteen defendants who
allegedly belonged to the Communist Party, several Justices complaining
that their conviction represented “a political trial” in violation of the First
Amendment.50

42

RICHARD H. MITCHELL, THOUGHT CONTROL IN PREWAR JAPAN 15-36 (1976).
Albion Ross, Goebbels Edits the Popular Mind in Germany, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
14, 1937, 123; Hugh Byas, Japan’s Censors Aspire to “Thought Control,” N.Y.
TIMES, April 18, 1937, 128.
44
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
45
Id.
46
Murray Illson, Dodds Finds Peril to Free Education: Princeton Head Warns
of U.S. ‘Thought-Control’ in Talk at Washington & Lee Event, N.Y. TIMES,
April 13, 1949, 30.
47
Suit Begun to Kill New Security Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1950, 6.
48
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 77
(2000).
49
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 99
(2000).
50
Del Dixon, ed., THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE 282 (2001).
43
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The Supreme Court referred repeatedly to thought control in the
1950s, always as a distinguishing characteristic of totalitarian regimes.51
In 1950, for example, the Court made a point of refuting a charge of
thought control against §9(h) of the 1947 Labor Management Relations
Act, requiring Labor union officers to file an affidavit stating that they
were not communist.52 Similarly, in 1952, the Court rejected a charge that
piping music into public streetcars constituted “thought control,” though
Justice Douglas warned of it in a dissent.53 “[O]nce privacy is invaded,”
he declared, “privacy is gone,” insinuating that even though playing
government-sponsored music on streetcars might have been a harmless
cultural program, “[i]t may be but a short step,” he prophesied, “from a
cultural program to a political program.”54 Though a passing assertion in
an arguably inconsequential dissent, Douglas’s mention of “political
program[s]” in Public Utilities v. Pollak revealed the manner in which he
viewed “the right of privacy” to be a “powerful deterrent to anyone who
would control men’s minds.”55
Closely linked to the Court’s interest in “men’s minds” was a
concomitant interest in restrictions on what private citizens could read.
Evidence of this emerged not simply in thought control cases like Public
Utilities v. Pollak and American Communications v. Douds, but obscenity
cases like Butler v. Michigan, decided in 1957, where the Supreme Court
struck down an Illinois statute enjoining “the publication or distribution of
materials ‘manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth.”56
Though comfortable with the idea that states could control obscenity, the
Court rejected the idea that standards set for children should govern
adults.57 Four months later, the Court confronted the problem of obscenity
again; this time in a case challenging the conviction of Samuel Roth, a
bookseller convicted of publishing a magazine entitled American
Aphrodite.58 Here, the Court cabined what could be considered obscene,
exempting works of literature and art thought to have critical merit, aimed
at more than simply “appealing to the prurient interest.”59
Ironically, even as the Court worked to liberalize restrictions on
erotic literature, so too did Cold War conservatives link the cause of
51

LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 82, 193,
194, 314 (2000).
52
American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 411-12 (1950)
(distinguishing §9(h) from the “straw man of ‘thought control’”).
53
Public Utilities Commission of D.C. v. Pollak 343 U.S. 451, 460 n. 6.
54
Public Utilities Commission of D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 469 (Douglas
dissenting). In 1959, the Court overturned the suspension of a Hawaii attorney
who had declared that Smith Act trials were leading the country to the “dark
ages of thought control.” In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 627 n. 4.
55
Public Utilities Commission of D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 469 (Douglas
dissenting).
56
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
57
LUCAS A. POWE, THE WARREN COURT & AMERICAN POLITICS 114-15 (2000).
58
Del Dixon, ed., THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE 353 (2001).
59
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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sexual liberation to national weakness and communism.60 “[S]exual
excesses or degeneracy,” notes historian Elaine Tyler May, were
considered by conservatives in the 1950s to make “individuals easy prey
for communist tactics.”61 Consequently, the FBI “mounted an all-out
effort to discover the personal sexual habits of those under suspicion of
subversive behavior,” with a particular emphasis on “homosexuals.”62
According to Nebraska Senator Kenneth Wherry, it was impossible to
“separate homosexuals from subversives,” a sentiment that led to an
“obsession” with rooting out gays in government.63 Also targeted were
heterosexual officials living outside the “maturity” and “responsibility” of
marriage, sparking a bizarrely Puritanical crusade to regulate both sexual
proclivities and private thought.64
Notions that sexual deviance threatened national security cut
against the Supreme Court’s tendency towards liberalizing erotic literature
and freeing “men’s minds,” perhaps explaining why the Court avoided
striking down Ohio’s obscenity law in Mapp, preferring instead the less
salacious path of invoking the exclusionary rule against the states.65
Though Justices Harlan, Frankfurter and Whittaker balked when Clark
mentioned the exclusionary rule, an issue that Mapp’s attorneys had not
briefed, the impulse to sidestep sex and overturn Wolf v. Colorado may
simply have been an effort to “hide” one train behind another, as privacy
scholar David Sklansky argues the Court did six years later in Katz v.
United States, again a case involving police and sex.66 Indeed, Sklansky’s
observation that the Court sought to hide protections for gay men
subjected to police surveillance in the rhetoric of Fourth Amendment
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privacy may itself have stemmed from judicial frustration with histrionic
Cold War claims that homosexuals threatened national security.67
Even if the Court was not responding to Cold War sexual paranoia,
the majority opinion in Mapp nevertheless framed the extension of the
exclusionary rule to the states in decidedly intimate terms. According to
Justice Clark, the police in question did not simply arrest Dollree Mapp
for possessing pornographic literature; they “broke” into her home and
proceeded to run “roughshod” over her.68 In terms evoking sexual assault
and even rape, Justice Clark recounted how one officer retrieved a sheet of
paper from Mapp’s “bosom,” “grabbed her,” “twisted her hand,” and
“forcibly” took her “upstairs to the bedroom,” as she “yelled [and] pleaded
with him” that “it was hurting.”69 Though the pornographic literature in
question was ultimately found in the basement, Justice Clark focused his
resuscitation of facts on the bedroom, noting how police searched “a
dresser, a chest of drawers, a closet and some suitcases,” even perusing “a
photo album” belonging to the defendant.70
According to criminal law scholar Jeannie Suk, judicial
articulations of privacy in gendered terms – as attacks on the privacy of
women – reflected a larger “anxiety” suffered by men “about intrusion”
into male dominated private space.71 This anxiety, argues Suk, stemmed
in part from the traditional “nineteenth century bourgeois ideal” of the
home as a man’s castle – a place where a man’s property, including his
spouse, was protected from other men.72 This anxiety also stemmed from
a concern that men be free from “state intrusion” in matters sexual,
including the right to “look at images of sex and naked women,” a right
the Court actually came to recognize in Stanley v. Georgia in 1969.73
Though Mapp predated Stanley by eight years, the gendered tone of
Clark’s opinion, coupled with the pornography laden facts at issue in
Mapp, suggest that preserving porn may in fact have been one of the
inspirations for suddenly invoking the exclusionary rule; making it an
early defense to sexual “thought control.”74
67
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Another, more commonly cited inspiration for the Mapp ruling was
race, a point made by criminal procedure scholars like Tracey Meares and
Thomas Davies.75 According to Davies, the “racist police abuse” in Mapp
together with a prior decision styled Monroe v. Pape, “may have
convinced Justice Clark that it was past time to extend federal supervision
to state criminal justice.”76 Yet, the precise manner in which Mapp aided
racial minorities is not clear.77 In fact, as the next section will show,
initial signs that police procedure improved in the wake of Mapp quickly
gave way to reports that the decision was pushing police to new levels of
corruption in New York City, both in terms of how they procured
evidence and how they treated minorities on the street.78 If Mapp’s genius
was its ability to mask sexual prurience in the theatre of domestic privacy,
then its downfall would be what Devon Carbado calls the “racial theater”
of the street.79
II. “SUBSTANCE NOT SHADOW”
Decided on June 19, 1961, Mapp appeared to have an immediately
positive impact on police.80 According to Richard Kuh, Secretary of the
New York State District Attorney’s Association, police did in fact become
more serious about acquiring warrants before conducting searches of
private homes following the ruling.81 Prior to Mapp, claimed Kuh,
officers rarely requested a warrant before searching an individual’s private
“apartment, home, flat, [or] loft.”82 “All this has changed,” he argued in
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September of 1962, one year after the opinion was handed down,
tendencies towards ignoring warrant requirements “changed overnight.”83
Yet, Mapp triggered unanticipated effects as well. Over a twelve
month period, for example, arrests for illegal lottery or “policy” violations
dropped thirty-five percent in New York City.84 During that same time
period, convictions for “narcotics misdemeanor offenses” dropped forty
percent.85 Similar drops could be found for “contraband – possession of
weapons, [and] obscene prints.”86 Such declines, maintained Kuh,
stemmed from the fact that officers felt uncertain as to whether they could
lawfully search suspects who were not officially under arrest.87
Even as arrests dropped, a more troubling phenomenon also
emerged: police corruption appeared to increase. According to Kuh,
during the year immediately following Mapp, police testimony became
increasingly “improbable” as officers began to testify that upon seeing
police, suspects simply “removed” objects from their pockets, “threw”
them to the ground, and obviated the need for a search.88 Similarly, police
assigned to search private homes began to testify more frequently that they
had been “invited” to search the homes of defendants, again precluding the
need for a warrant.89 Not only did Mapp reduce arrests, in other words,
but it also encouraged police to stretch the truth, telling more elaborate
“stories” to bolster the arrests they did make.90
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In a study of almost 4,000 arrests, New York Legal Services
corroborated Kuh’s suspicions, providing hard data that police arrest
narratives changed significantly in the aftermath of the ruling. 91 For
example, claims that suspects mysteriously “dropped” contraband upon
sight of police rose significantly after the decision, particularly among
uniformed officers who reported a 71.8 percent spike in such “dropsies”
during the year immediately following Mapp.92 Meanwhile, reports that
police found contraband “hidden on the person” of suspects declined
significantly at precisely the same time, indicating that police were
suddenly cautious about admitting to searches.93
An officer provided a clue into the brave new world of evidence
recovery post-Mapp during an illegal search trial in New York City on
September 12, 1962.94 Charged with unlawfully searching a suspect, the
officer claimed that he “frisked” suspects but did not conduct actual
searches of them.95 Pressed by a judge, the officer then demonstrated a
standard frisk before the court, a relatively violent maneuver that aimed to
shake evidence to the ground.96 Rather than simply pat down the outside
of the suspect’s clothing, for example, the patrolman “grabbed” the
suspect “and practically lifted him off his feet”; meanwhile shaking him to
loosen any items that might be secreted in his pockets, waistband, or
belt.97 As a cigarette lighter and pair of eyeglasses “fell” to the floor, the
manner in which a frisk might generate a drop suddenly became apparent,
leaving open the question whether Mapp’s prohibition on searches also
applied to frisks, even forceful ones like the one demonstrated by the
officer.98
Even if officers decided against frisks, other means of procuring
evidence from suspects on the street emerged post-Mapp.99 In Cincinnati,
for example, patrolmen “rush[ed]” suspects, “hoping to produce a panic”
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that would then lead them to “visibly discard” evidence.100 Here too, the
Court’s application of the exclusionary rule had a counterintuitive effect;
increasing the likelihood that police would engage in menacing behavior
to get suspects to drop evidence.101
Police efforts to induce dropped evidence indicate that rather than
improve police conduct, Mapp may have only intensified the use of force,
lying, and deception, pressing police to misrepresent how, precisely, they
acquired evidence.102 Of course, most dropsy cases did not involve the
search of private homes, hence Mapp’s success at garnering greater
warrant requests. However, even Mapp’s warrant data raised questions
about the decision’s ultimate effects. For example, New York Legal
Services concluded that although police requested more warrants to search
private rooms following Mapp, the actual location of arrests generally
seemed to migrate out of private rooms and into public spaces following
the decision. To illustrate, the location of most arrests prior to Mapp were
streets (35%) and “unexplained rooms” (26%) meaning “rooms entered
without explanation by the police.”103 Following the ruling, police
reported lower numbers of arrests in unexplained rooms, dropping them
from 26% to 17.6%, meanwhile increasing arrests in “hallways,” “roof
landings,” and “basements.”104
What did this mean? Just as Mapp may have pressured officers to
acquire warrants before entering homes, so too may the decision have
refocused police attention on public space.105 Rather than improve police
professionalism, in other words, the decision simply transported police
corruption, removing it from private homes to public areas (streets,
100
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hallways, roof landings, and basements), where police could then shake
down suspects for evidence.106 This seemed a reasonable conclusion to
New York Legal Services, who surmised that officers may have “stopped
entering private rooms” and turned instead to spending “more time in the
streets and halls.”107 Rather than “level the playing field” between rich
and poor, in other words, Mapp simply provided more privacy to the
already well-off, particularly those wealthy enough to live behind closed
doors – either in spacious suburban homes or door-manned buildings –
where police were unlikely to prowl.108 Conversely, poor residents of
cramped apartments and public housing projects – the very people most in
need of public space – suddenly found themselves the targets of
intensified police searches, albeit in their halls, landings, and
basements.109
To what extent, if any, did the Supreme Court anticipate such an
outcome? Rather than predict police corruption, the Court seemed
convinced that Mapp would diminish it. “If the government becomes a
lawbreaker,” lectured the majority opinion, “it breeds contempt for the
law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy.”110 Rather than breed anarchy, the Court seemed to think it was
restoring public confidence by reforming police behavior. “[N]othing can
destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own
laws,” the Court concluded, implying that Mapp would ultimately pressure
law enforcement to heightened, not lowered, lawfulness.111
Not everyone agreed. Only a few months after Mapp was handed
down, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission declared that better methods of
improving police conduct existed than “those which provide sanctions
after the fact,” like the exclusionary rule.112 To the Commission’s mind,
“preventive” measures promised to be more effective at regulating police
106
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misconduct, including measures aimed at the “application of professional
standards to the selection and training of policemen.”113 Such standards
worked for “Federal police agents,” asserted the report, and could be
further augmented by “good pay, high recruit selection standards, and
training in scientific crime detection, in human relations, and in police
administration.”114
To encourage such reforms, the Commission
recommended federal “grants-in-aid” to state and local governments,
enabling them to develop “selection tests and standards,” “training
programs in constitutional rights and human relations,” and “college-level
schools of police administration.”115
While the Civil Rights Commission advocated improvements in
police training, state and local courts struggled with the challenge of how,
precisely, to interpret Mapp. “I cannot here even begin to develop all of
the conflicting opinions that have been rendered by a variety of trial
judges,” lamented District Attorney Richard Kuh one year after the
decision.116 To take just a few examples, the Bronx County trial court or
“Supreme Court” as it was called in New York, held in People v. Salerno
that officers had probable cause to frisk a suspicious individual on the
street based on the time of night he was sighted, the manner in which he
was dressed, and the fact that he appeared to be carrying a weapon.117
Meanwhile, the New York County Supreme Court held the opposite in
People v. Rivera, a case where police stopped and “patted the outside”
clothing of a suspect detected at 1:30 A.M. peering into the window of a
bar and grill in a high crime neighborhood of Manhattan.118 According to
the Court, police officers were authorized to stop but not frisk such
suspects prior to arrest.119
Not long thereafter, the New York Court of Appeals outraged
police when it overturned a policy conviction in which officers had made
repeated sightings of individuals handing money to a suspect on the street,
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searched the suspect, and found a list of numbers and cash.120 Though
considered a “classic policy collector situation,” Romie Moore’s arrest
struck the state’s highest appellate court as unlawful, particularly since
“mere evidence of persons handing money to another person does not
prove a crime.”121 Not only did police find such an observation absurd,
but the court failed to answer the question whether an officer could search
a defendant even if he did not have “conclusive proof” that a crime was
being committed.122
By March of 1962, Governor Nelson Rockefeller joined police in
declaring that “confusion” had become Mapp’s primary contribution to the
law of search and arrest.123 To aid patrolmen on the street, Rockefeller
endorsed a wave of measures aimed at improving working conditions,
training, and pay for police, many of which echoed the Civil Rights
Commission’s recommendations of 1961.124 To take just a few examples,
the governor endorsed additional appropriations for state police so that
they would not have to work more than forty hours a week.125 Rockefeller
also announced a fifty percent increase in the number of required training
hours for police, going from eighty to one hundred twenty; and
recommended uniform standards “of age, education, and physical and
character qualifications,” for all new recruits.126 For older police officers
who “who never had formal training” he endorsed the creation of courses
that paralleled the “mandatory basic course” required of entry-level
police.127
Despite Rockefeller’s best hopes, police found calls for increased
training to be on par with measures like the exclusionary rule, superficial
checks that ignored the root causes of inequality. According to New York
Police Commissioner Vincent Broderick, large percentages of New York’s
“Negro and Spanish-speaking” population were “being discriminated
against in housing and forced to live in ghetto areas”128 Addressing such
structural issues, argued Broderick, was more important than correcting
120
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superficial matters of training or procedure.129 To his mind, the
“devastating” poverty of the ghetto, including poor “education,”
“housing,” and “employment,” were “the pressing issue[s] of our time.”130
“Is it not time,” declared Broderick on February 8, 1966, “for us to stand
up and say that we intend to deal with substance and not with shadow?”131
Only the “marshalling of all of the resources of the State and Federal
Governments,” continued Broderick, “could “help these, our fellow
citizens.”132
In the absence of structural reform, police pushed for more limited
gains; including a statute authorizing officers “to search and question a
person” suspected of committing a crime “without making an arrest.”133
An early reference to stop and frisks, the measure gained endorsements
from the Combined Council of Law Enforcement Officials, a body made
up of the State District Attorneys Association, the State Sheriffs
Association, the Municipal Police Training Council and the State
Association of Chiefs of Police.134 All four agencies hoped to carve out
exceptions to Mapp via state legislation, a point they made clear in a
pamphlet entitled Let your Police – Police! arguing that Mapp had
“rendered good police work meaningless and police experience
worthless.”135 To illustrate, the pamphlet cited the facts in People v.
Cassone, a case involving a police officer who noticed two men “lugging
a heavy object” into the trunk of a car, only to find that it was a Western
Union safe.136 Unbelievably, the trial court held that the arrest was
unlawful “because it was based on ‘mere suspicion’” not probable
cause.137
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To remedy such problems, the NYPD joined the Combined
Council and endorsed four bills that would “correct certain inequities” in
the law of criminal procedure.138 Two of the four bills authorized officers
to arrest suspects in cases where they had “reasonable grounds” for
believing that a crime either was being committed or had just been
completed.139 The third facilitated “the execution of warrants” where
property risked being destroyed and the fourth authorized police to “stop,
temporarily detain, question and search a person for weapons” where there
was “reasonable ground” to suspect a crime.140
That the NYPD would push for a state law authorizing officers to
stop and frisk suspects who appeared armed was not, on its face, a
revolutionary move. The genesis of formalizing stop and frisks had
emerged as early as 1939, when the Interstate Commission on Crime
appointed a committee to draft a model code governing the law of
arrest.141 Prior to that point, a disorganized blend of common law and
statute governed how police could handle suspicious persons on the
street.142 Often, this left officers confused about whether stops were
technically arrests or not, leading some to avoid questioning suspicious
individuals for fear of “a suit for false arrest.”143 At other times, police
extended stops to the point that they became unregulated detentions, or
“imprisonment ex communicado” a phenomenon that the Uniform Arrest
Act sought to contain by placing a two hour limitation on the time that
police could detain someone.144
In addition to regulating stops, the Arrest Act also governed frisks,
or searches, authorizing officers to search suspects if they had a reasonable
fear that they were dangerous.145 By holding that a law enforcement
officer could search someone whenever he had “reasonable ground to
believe that he is in danger,” the Model Act settled one of the many
questions raised by Mapp, namely whether officers could stop and search
suspects without a warrant, and without having to lie and say that the
138
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suspect had dropped contraband. Rather than encourage corruption, in
other words, the Act sought to reinforce “respect” for the law among
police, meanwhile reducing the odds that suspects might feel “unjustly
treated,” and less willing to “cooperate.”146
To its backers, the “stop and frisk” law reinforced the emerging
image of the police officer as a professional and an “expert,” the very kind
of individual that Governor Rockefeller sought to produce with higher
standards, in-house training programs, and better hours.147 Further, the
Council promoted the statute as a much needed safety measure for police,
not just a tool for better, more effective law enforcement. “Under present
law,” declared the Council, stopping and frisking a subject would not only
amount to an unlawful arrest, but could even invite suspects to use “as
much force as necessary” to stop the officer in question, even harming
them.148 Convinced that a stop and frisk law would improve police work
conditions, the Combined Council also argued that it benefited those who
were searched. Recognizing that police might arrest individuals who they
would otherwise only stop and frisk, the Council noted that “[w]henever
an innocent person is arrested, charged with a crime, and brought before a
magistrate, his reputation is harmed, he is humiliated, greatly
inconvenienced and put to considerable expense.”149 Better that suspects
simply get patted down on the side-walk and set free.
Not everyone agreed. Black assemblymen objected to the stop and
frisk legislation, arguing “that it would help create a ‘police state’ by
subjecting the people of their districts to ‘even greater abuse than they
now suffer at the hands of police.’”150 At the time, the “highest
concentration” of arrests in New York occurred in predominantly black
neighborhoods, most notably Harlem.151 Aware of such geographic
concerns, black politicians argued that New York’s stop and frisk law
would “allow policemen to ‘push around’ citizens and permit them to
operate as ‘the Gestapo,’” precisely the type of totalitarianism that the
Court had tried to address in Mapp.152 Yet, the terrain had shifted. While
Mapp created a zone of freedom within the home, it intensified police
surveillance of the street, a move perfected by the normalization of stop
and frisks.153 As the next section demonstrates, support for stop and frisk
only intensified as urban unrest grew, creating a stark disconnect between
146
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national narratives of expanding rights for criminal defendants and state
sponsored policies of ghetto control.
III. “TO CORRAL AND CONTROL THE GHETTO”
Black complaints about New York’s stop and frisk law
underscored the complexity of police/minority relations in the city, a
relationship that would only become more strained as the 1960s
progressed. For example, in June 1963 racial unrest exploded when over
1,000 African Americans gathered to protest the arrest of a “Negro vendor
of ices” in Harlem as officers “swinging nightsticks” quelled the crowd.154
According to James Farmer, national director of the Congress of Racial
Equality, or CORE, such violence threatened to “boil up in Harlems
throughout the country” as black frustration over increased joblessness
and “slum conditions” threatened “racial turmoil.”155 To avoid such
turmoil, borough legislators met to “propose stronger laws curtailing job
discrimination against Negroes and other minorities,” prompting city
leaders to acknowledge the challenge that structural inequalities posed to
black life.156 Yet, even as New York officials discoursed about long term
goals like employment, housing, and education, so too did they recognize
the short term necessity of keeping things calm. According to New York
City Mayor Robert F. Wagner “[c]onstructive changes” were taking place
“in both the North and the South,” but this did not change the fact that
police bore a particularly “difficult and delicate responsibility” to preserve
“peace” and “order.”157
Precisely the kind of threat to order that Wagner alluded to
emerged in New York in April 1963 when local chapters of CORE
threatened to stall “hundreds of cars” on the highways leading to the
World’s Fair in Queens, including the Grand Central Parkway, the
Brooklyn-Queens Expressway, the Long Island Expressway and the Van
Wyck.158 Not only did New York Mayor Robert Wagner declare such
protest to be “illegal” but Attorney General Robert Kennedy declared it
“irresponsible” and President Lyndon Johnson warned that the proposed
demonstration risked “threats to safety,” even “violence.”159
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Though CORE backed down, discord reemerged on July 9, 1963,
when civil rights activists initiated a sit-in on the steps of Manhattan’s
City Hall.160 Initially, Wagner allowed the demonstrators to “conduct
their sit-in without hindrance,” declaring that he had “deep sympathy” for
their effort to “focus public attention on the basic problem of civil
rights.”161 However, the demonstrators quickly began to engage in
activity that Wagner later characterized as “outright provocation,”
including “outbursts of shouting, chanting, and littering” that created “an
unjustifiable interference with the orderly operations of Government at its
very seat and center.”162
On August 22, violence between the
demonstrators and police erupted, resulting in the injury of three
officers.163 Outraged, Mayor Wagner ordered the “immediate removal” of
the protestors.164 To his mind, the fight to maintain order in the face of
what was quickly becoming a “social revolution” taxed police in ways that
the fight against “crime and evil” did not.165 Suddenly, law enforcement
had to be versed not simply in “police tactics,” but also in “civil rights,”
precisely so that they could better communicate with potential
demonstrators, hopefully diffusing demonstrations without sparking
violence.166
From this came a need for a “well-educated and
professionally trained” force, one made up of what Wagner referred to as
“professional soldiers.”167
That Wagner wished for professional police/soldiers versed in
rights rhetoric underscored the manner in which police professionalism
related to the successful management of political demonstrations and
minority communities in New York. If police were better educated and
160
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better trained, Wagner implied, then they might be less prone to
aggravating urban crowds, and less likely to incite riots – whether
structural factors changed or not.168 Dramatic evidence of the link
between police and riots emerged in the summer of 1964, when violence
broke out in New York after a white police officer shot a fifteen year old
black male in Harlem.169 During a demonstration protesting the boy’s
death, “[t]housands” of African Americans “raced through the center of
Harlem, attacking white persons, pulling fire alarms and looting stores.”170
Violence continued for three days, eventually spreading to the Bedford
Stuyvesant neighborhood of Brooklyn where a “full scale riot” exploded
after CORE “staged another rally to protest the shooting of the Negro
youth.”171
In an editorial commenting on the violence, black writer James
Baldwin confirmed the relationship between police procedure and ghetto
containment. “There is a very good reason for the Negroes to hate the
police in Harlem,” declared Baldwin, their “competence” was “abysmal”
and “they know no other way of coping with the forces to which they are
exposed” than to engage in “brutality.”172 Such brutality, continued
Baldwin, formed a critical part of their efforts “to corral and control the
citizens of the ghetto.”173 Baldwin’s accusation that the NYPD sought
primarily to “corral” the ghetto coincided eerily with the police’s own
complaints that judicial insistence on procedural reform simply obscured
the unfair burden placed on police to maintain urban harmony, meanwhile
ignoring the need for substantive political and economic change.174 Here,
a prominent black voice corroborated police complaints, underscoring
procedure’s role in preventing urban unrest.
That urban unrest threatened the nation became apparent to many
during the early months of 1964 as metropolitan areas across the United
States erupted in violence.175 In Jackson, Mississippi, for example,
“hundreds of [black] students threw, rocks, bricks and bottles,” at
“helmeted officers” after a white man struck a black coed with his
automobile in February.176 Meanwhile in Chicago, “angry blacks” set
168
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“fire” to a convenience store and proceeded to “rampage” for two nights
after a white shopkeeper accused a black woman of “stealing a bottle of
gin.”177 In Atlanta, upwards of 300 black protestors engaged in a
“brawling sidewalk demonstration” against “[t]en robed Ku Klux
Klansmen” who had entered a downtown Krystal’s restaurant.178 Among
the demonstrators was John Lewis, chairman of the Student Non-Violent
Coordinating Committee, who allegedly “kicked and elbowed officers” as
they placed him under arrest.179
The worst rioting stemmed directly from police action. Not only
did violence explode in Harlem and Bedford Stuyvesant after police shot a
black teenager in July 1964, but rioting began north of the city in
Rochester after “white police moved into a Negro neighborhood” to arrest
a man “who had been creating a disturbance at a dance” that same
month.180 Not long thereafter, rioting exploded for three consecutive
nights in Paterson, New Jersey after police arrested “a Negro woman on a
disorderly conduct charge.”181 Ninety miles south, in Philadelphia, the
arrest of “a Negro woman whose car was blocking an intersection” led to
“disorders” that lasted three nights in August as “[r]ioters broke store
windows, looted shops, [and] hurled bricks from roofs at police.”182
The alarming spike in black violence caught the attention not only
of average Americans but international audiences. Soviet newspapers like
Isvestiia and Pravda boasted headline coverage of American race riots,
charging America for being a land of racial discrimination and political
tyranny.183 Similarly, “leaders of African nations denounced the United
States” for its perceived treatment of racial minorities, transforming
America’s ghetto riots into a Cold War liability warranting quick,
effective, state control.184
Public embarrassment over riots spurred government officials
across the country, including police, prosecutors, and judges to find ways
of quelling the urban disorder.185 In Philadelphia, for example, officials
deliberately curtailed a local tradition, the annual Mummer’s Parade, to
177
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minimize rioting.186 Traditionally held on New Year’s Day, the parade
featured upwards of “15,000 mummers” belonging to thirty-one different
marching clubs, including “22 string band units, four fancy groups in
satin-covered floats and huge capes and five brigades of comics.”187 The
comics, in a manner that would prove explosive in 1964, often performed
“in blackface,” a practice that roused white concern when city officials
learned of “an active recruiting campaign being conducted in Harlem for
persons to come here and protest.”188 Local CORE chairman Louis Smith
warned that police should “look out for the rooftops because that is the
way the people of New York operate,” implying that outside
demonstrators would come to Philadelphia from New York and hurl
missiles down onto paraders.189 Philadelphia’s “400 Negro ministers”
concurred, warning that “rioting along the route of the parade” was likely
to occur.190
To prevent violence, local ministers filed suit in city court, arguing
for an injunction banning anyone in blackface from participating in the
march.191 During hearings before a three judge panel, police officials
warned that “there might be ‘physical violence’” unless blackface
marchers were “barred” from the parade.192 Though attorneys for the
parade countered that “blackface” was “traditional” and that marchers
“had no intention of belittling Negroes,” the three judges presiding over
the case decided that a real threat of violence existed, warranting an end to
the city’s blackface tradition.193
As Philadelphia judges regulated Mummers, New York police
focused on radical black leaders, among them William Epton, an activist
arrested for conspiracy to riot and criminal anarchy in August 1964.194
Epton’s conviction stemmed from the 1964 riots in Harlem, during which
Epton publicly called for “organized resistance to the police and the
destruction of the state.”195 Epton objected to his conviction, arguing that
while he had been an outspoken critic of New York’s “paramilitary police
force,” his primary concerns were structural, focused on the “inhumane
conditions” of ghetto life, including the persistence of high “infant
mortality rates,” “tuberculosis,” and “unemployment.”196
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New York authorities showed little sympathy, positing that the
black radical not only voiced interest in encouraging riots, but presented a
clear and present danger to the state – a critical element in the charge of
criminal anarchy.197 Not invoked since the prosecution of Communist
Benjamin Gitlow in 1920, criminal anarchy seemed a poor fit for Epton,
who at best appeared to represent a radical fringe of city politics.198 Yet,
the very fact that Epton became the subject of criminal prosecution
underscored at least two interconnected phenomena relating to criminal
procedure and radical politics in New York at the time.199
First, Epton’s conviction for criminal anarchy not only invoked
memories of the persecution of communists like Benjamin Gitlow in the
1920s, but pointed to persistent concerns with the kind of structural
change that communists continued to endorse into the 1960s. Like
Gitlow, for example, Epton also identified with the communist cause,
serving as the “vice chairman” of Harlem’s “Progressive Labor
Movement,” a “Maoist” organization boasting upwards of 1,200
members.200 Though not a union leader, to be sure, Epton’s concern with
structural inequality paralleled police concerns with structural inequality;
underscoring the fact that both police and advocates for the poor viewed
procedural reforms simply as superficial salves to much deeper, structural
wounds.
Not only did Epton’s identification with radical labor point to
police/poor parallels, but Epton’s conviction itself suggested a contested
relationship between the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure rulings and
civil rights. When Mapp v. Ohio was decided in 1961, for example, many
assumed that the Court’s criminal procedure rulings stemmed from an
interest in civil rights, an interest articulated in rulings like Brown v.
Board of Education in 1954 and Cooper v. Aaron attacking massive
resistance to civil rights in 1958.201 Yet, the Court’s zeal for such cases
cooled in 1964 even as it blazed ahead with its regulation of police,
indicating a disconnect between heightened social control and national
narratives of expanding freedoms.202
To illustrate, the Court’s early interest in protesters’ rights
culminated in a series of rulings overturning the convictions of black
demonstrators from 1961 to 1964.203 One such demonstrator, Janette
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Hoston, entered a Kress Department store in Baton Rouge on March 29,
1960 and proceeded to sit at a lunch counter reserved for whites.204 When
Hoston refused a request to leave, local police arrested her for disturbing
the peace.205 Though a relatively minor criminal charge, Hoston’s breach
of the peace conviction nevertheless made it to the United States Supreme
Court, who found the case “barren of any evidence that would support a
finding that the petitioners’ conduct would even ‘foreseeably’ have
disturbed the public.”206
The conclusion was dubious.
Sit-in
demonstrations had in fact provoked violence and “fist fights between
members of the two races” across the South, as the respondents argued in
their brief, but the Court ignored such calamities in a bold statement of
support for Hoston’s protest.207
The Court continued its support for protest from 1961 to 1964,
deciding upwards of twenty cases in favor of black demonstrators. 208 In
one of the last such cases, decided in 1964, the Court overturned another
breach of the peace conviction, this time in Columbia, South Carolina. In
a case styled Barr v. City of Columbia, the Court reviewed the arrest of
“five Negro college students” for breach of the peace, holding that their
sit-in demonstration had been “quiet,” “peaceful,” and unlikely “to move
onlookers to commit acts of violence.”209 Though opposing counsel
disagreed, arguing that the demonstration had been “quite tense,” and that
“everyone was on pins and needles … for fear that it could possibly lead
to violence,” the Court once again downplayed any relationship between
demonstrations and unrest.210
Barr was the last protest case to hit the Court before the Harlem,
Rochester, and Patterson riots that summer. As pitched violence between
urban blacks and white police intensified from June to August, the Court
reevaluated its position on civil rights demonstrations generally, gradually
moving against protesters in a batch of cases originating in the South, two
of which involved protests in a church and one of which involved a
demonstration in a school.211 In both, the Court denied certiorari, leaving
the convictions intact without a pronouncement of law.212 Subsequent
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refusals to grant cert followed, coupled with articulations of concern about
black demonstrators in cases like Cox v. Louisiana in 1965. There, the
Court held that the exercise of free speech had to be tempered with the
need for “maintaining public order, without which liberty itself would be
lost in the excesses of anarchy.”213 One year later, the Court upheld the
conviction of thirty-two black college students who had gathered in protest
at the Leon County jail in Tallahassee, Florida.214 Though the students
were charged with malicious trespass, a conviction the Court had
overturned in earlier cases like Bouie v. City of Columbia and Hamm v.
City of Rock Hill, Justice Black held that the demonstrators no longer
possessed the right to protest “wherever they please,” maintaining instead
that local municipalities – “no less than a private owner of property” –
retained the “power to preserve the property under its control for the use to
which it is lawfully dedicated.”215 Subsequent anti-protest rulings
followed; some clearly upholding convictions that would, according to
civil rights lawyer Jack Greenberg “have been reversed” under the Court’s
early, enthusiastic civil rights phase.216 By the close of 1967, the Supreme
Court had so tired of civil rights that it even upheld the conviction of black
civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. for violating an injunction not to
march in Birmingham, Alabama four years earlier, noting that “[t]his
Court cannot hold that the petitioners were constitutionally free to ignore
all the procedures of the law and carry their battle to the streets.” 217
Forgetting that the “battle in the streets” in Birmingham had in fact been
one of the movement’s most significant victories, the Court sided instead
with what King referred to as the “recalcitrant forces in the Deep South
that will use the courts to perpetuate the unjust and illegal system of racial
separation.”218
As the Court curtailed southern streets, so too did it constrict urban
landscapes in the North. One year after upholding King’s conviction, for
example, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of William Epton in
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New York, again for violating an injunction not to march.219 Though
Epton was ultimately charged with criminal anarchy, New York’s
corporation counsel Leo Larkin had also acquired a “temporary
injunction” banning black protest.220 As in Alabama, such injunctions
proved a practical tool for containing black protest, one of the many “legal
means” that New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller invoked “to maintain
order in the state.”221 Though Epton and King differed in their rhetoric,
King endorsing non-violence and Epton exhorting blacks to “smash” the
state, both leaders fell victim to the same phenomenon: a growing
consensus on the Court that black protest in public space needed to be
contained.222
One possible explanation for the Court’s move against civil rights
demonstrators just as the nation was celebrating civil rights gains may
have been political. While early civil rights demonstrations in the
American South curried national sympathy for the black plight, later
protests in the North and West sent tendrils of fear through the nation,
causing many to fear large-scale disorder and unrest.223 As Supreme
Court Justice Hugo Black put it in 1965, “the crowds that press in the
streets for noble goals today can be supplanted tomorrow by street mobs
pressuring the courts for precisely opposite ends.”224 Assistant Attorney
General for Civil Rights Burke Marshall agreed, declaring that while it
was “one thing” to demonstrate against unjust Jim Crow laws in the South,
it was “another” to take the strategy of civil disobedience and apply it to
the “complex and deep-rooted economic and social problems” plaguing
minority communities in the urban north.225 Such an approach, Marshall
warned, risked spreading both disrespect for law and an ensuing “crisis in
law enforcement.”226
Of course, New York police had long claimed that precisely such a
crisis was brewing, only growing more deadly as structural causes of
inequality went unaddressed.227 However, the Court showed less interest
in ameliorating structural inequality than it did in regulating face-to-face
interactions on the street, both by sanctioning the use of injunctions
against black demonstrators and, as urban unrest grew, continuing its
campaign to reform police procedure. For example, just as the Court
began to uphold the convictions of black demonstrators in the South, so
too did it impose even more stringent requirements on how police handled
criminal suspects in the North, including a requirement that officers alert
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defendants to their rights prior to questioning.228 Though liberals
celebrated this move, consecrated in a decision styled Miranda v. Arizona,
few squared it with the Court’s anti-protest cases, preferring instead to
read the opinion as a victory for the poor.229 However, the Court’s
demand that police inform suspects of their Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights promised little in the way of structural reform for poverty, sounding
instead like an eerie parallel to calls for a “professional army” well-versed
in rights rhetoric like the one endorsed by New York Mayor Robert
Wagner in 1963.230 To Wagner, a more rights-savvy police promised a
solution to urban discord, not an end to poverty, a matter that the Supreme
Court did not address directly in its Miranda opinion, though the
implications were clear once read beside its protest rulings. For example,
the Court’s decisions in Adderley, Walker, and Epton all indicate that the
nation’s highest tribunal was becoming increasingly interested in
corralling black anger, just as James Baldwin had warned in 1964.231
Though Miranda provided no guarantee that criminal defendants
would actually have their rights upheld, its part in a larger drama of
control was even more subtle, particularly as police departments
themselves took cosmetic measures to improve the appearance of police
action. For example, the NYPD deliberately hired a black officer named
Lloyd Sealy to head its Harlem precinct in 1964, a direct response to the
riots there that summer.232
One month later, New York Police
Commissioner Michael J. Murphy “warned” his men not to adopt a “rough
manner” when interacting with civilians, particularly racial minorities,
noting that harsh manners only bred “hatred and disrespect,” amounting to
nothing less than “verbal brutality.”233
Not long thereafter, the
Department organized a “two-day conclave” attended by chiefs of police
from San Francisco, St. Louis, Boston, and Atlanta – a nod to a
burgeoning North/South convergence – that aimed to “develop guidelines
for police in their daily contacts with the public.”234 Among such
guidelines was a need for police to “understand the problems,” and the
“frustrations … of the people living in the communities they serve.”235
Such attention to sensitivity dovetailed nicely with the Supreme Court’s
requirement in 1966 that police respect the dignity of criminal suspects by
publicly reading them their rights.236
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Yet, many patrolmen still felt mugged; particularly at decisions
like Miranda that interfered with their ability to fight crime.237 To them,
the ruling threatened the critical process of questioning suspects, a method
central to the discovery of evidence.238 However, police officials like
NYPD Commissioner Vincent Broderick took a broader view, explaining
to officers that the police function had changed and that patrolmen were
suddenly required to do “much more in the community than prevent
crime.”239 According to Broderick, they were also required to protect the
citizen’s right “to peaceful assembly and protest” meanwhile preserving a
“climate of law and social order.”240 Just as some had predicted earlier,
“crime-fighting” had gradually taken a back seat to “peace-keeping.”241
Though the new police function rankled some, preserving order did
not always mean infringing on police discretion. To illustrate, the
Supreme Court lifted a significant burden from police in 1968 when it
decided Terry v. Ohio, allowing officers to stop and frisk anyone
suspected of actively committing a crime or possessing a weapon. 242 In a
related case styled Sibron v. New York, the Court held that New York
police officers could rely on the Empire State’s “Stop and Frisk Law” so
long as they possessed “reasonable suspicion” that individuals were either
“engaged in criminal activity” or posed “a danger.”243 Though civil rights
groups like the NAACP argued that the New York law should be
invalidated because it promoted “uncontrolled and uncontrollable
discretion by law enforcement officers,” the Court disagreed, a major
victory for New York police unions.244 However, the Court did signal an
interest in curbing the excesses generated by Mapp, particularly its
disapproval of police tactics aimed at creating the illusion of dropped
evidence, a move achieved by overturning the conviction of a suspect who
police initially claimed “pulled out a tinfoil envelope and did attempt to
throw same to the ground.”245 Further, the Court also acknowledged that
“frisking” had indeed become “a severely exacerbating factor in police-
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community tensions,” a point underscoring the link between post-Mapp
policing and urban riots.246
Though lamented by liberals, both Sibron and Terry continued
efforts to normalize the streets in New York, marking the culmination of a
much larger campaign to address urban inequality through strategies of
riot-avoidance and containment. As we have seen, such strategies did not
involve structural reforms to ameliorate poverty so much as procedural
rules aimed at scripting police/minority conduct. Nor did such strategies
impinge on the larger narrative of expanding rights that came with Mapp
v. Ohio. In fact, one year after the Supreme Court handed down Terry, it
revisited a fact scenario uncannily similar to the one in Mapp but ruled
directly on the obscenity question, allowing individuals to possess obscene
materials in their homes; further expanding freedoms germane to domestic
space.247 Even as urban minorities complained of heightened police
surveillance on the street in other words, the Court continued to bolster a
national narrative of expanding constitutional freedoms, albeit from within
the private, interior confines of the home.
IV. CONCLUSION
Three months before the Supreme Court handed down its decision
in Terry v. Ohio, a commission appointed by President Lyndon Johnson to
investigate the causes of urban riots in the United States issued a report,
positing that the “abrasive” manner in which police handled ghetto
residents posed a “a major – and explosive – source of grievance, tension,
and disorder,” in the United States.248 Of particular concern to the Kerner
Commission, as it was called, were the “tension-creating effects” of “stopand-frisk” searches, particularly those conducted at random with little eye
to whether individuals were either armed or dangerous.249 Though the
report did not mention Mapp v. Ohio, it corroborated the findings of New
York Legal Services who had claimed five years earlier that the Supreme
Court’s extension of the exclusionary rule to the states had worsened
police conduct towards minorities.250 Terry, ironically, corrected for this,
restricting police to only frisking individuals suspected of being armed or
engaged in criminal activity.251
That Terry might have benefited minorities by undoing Mapp’s
negative effect on urban policing is generally not recognized by historians
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of criminal procedure in the United States.252 Instead, Terry tends to be
framed as a turn against the civil rights focus of Mapp, a coda to the
Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution.253 Yet, recovering Terry’s
role in correcting Mapp is important both for what it says about the
exclusionary rule and for what it says about the Warren Court’s criminal
procedure revolution generally. As this article has shown, the Court
framed the exclusionary rule in Mapp in terms of intimate privacy rather
than racial parity, a point that helps explain why the Court failed to
anticipate its negative, urban effects.254 Second, as this article has also
sought to demonstrate, both police unions and black activists lamented the
Court’s move into procedure not as a liberal effort to help the poor so
much as a deliberate attempt to sidestep the need for more extensive,
structural reform.255 Some, like black writer and activist James Baldwin
even accused the Court of simply trying to “corral and control” the
“ghetto.”256
Reframing the Court’s criminal procedure revolution as an effort to
control the ghetto, though at first glance cynical, actually helps to establish
two important points. First, the Supreme Court’s curtailment of police
behavior in opinions like Mapp v. Ohio did not help criminal defendants
evenly, proving much more useful to defendants in private houses than
public spaces.257 In fact, Mapp worsened police/minority conduct in such
spaces, so much so that police themselves began to lobby for formalized
stop and frisk rules.258 As the Supreme Court reviewed such rules, so too
did it interiorize liberty, thwarting police invasions of the home
meanwhile sanctioning heightened police surveillance of the street.259
While criminal law scholar Michelle Alexander has shown that
stop and frisks contribute to the incarceration of minorities, she fails to
account for the liberal/geographic forces that contributed to such a
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result.260 Like many historians of criminal procedure, Alexander roots the
rise of stop and frisk in a conservative backlash to the Warren Court’s
criminal procedure revolution, a backlash that extended through the War
on Drugs.261 While this was certainly a factor, the Warren Court’s
criminal procedure revolution contributed to incarceration as well, first in
the privacy frame that inspired Mapp v. Ohio, and later in efforts to curb
police malfeasance in urban landscapes.262 That liberal reform joined
conservative backlash in compartmentalizing liberty remains one of the
least understood, but still important lessons to be learned from criminal
procedure reform in the 1960s, a lesson demonstrating clearly how a
narrative of expanding liberty could coincide with mass incarceration.
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